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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue, 
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation and 
particularly describing the place to be searches, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
--Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 
The existence of the search and seizure restrictions 
encoded in the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution is the result of a two part historical 
development that took place simultaneously in England and 
the American colonies. Severe legislative restrictions on 
the press were largely responsible for the developments in 
England, while in the colonies it was British tax and trade 
regulations that spawned the changes. On both sides of the 
Atlantic, however, the primary catalyst was the government's 
use of general searches in the enforcement of those laws. 
It was the continued abuse of general searches despite the 
public's growing opposition to them that would ultimately 
prove responsible for the expression of reasonable search 
and seizure guidelines in the Bill of Rights. 
The history of search and seizure in England is largely 
the product of a series of conflicts between the British 
government and the press. In order to control seditious 
libel, the printing of material that is critical of or 
unflattering to the established government, or that may 
instigate rebellion against it, the English government 
placed major legislative restrictions on the printing 
industry. Dating back to the mid-1500s officials were given 
broad authority to search nearly anything they wanted in 
conjunction with a suspected violation of seditious libel 
' I 
laws. During the 1600s numerous regulations were passed 
that authorized even more strict censorship and broader 
search powers for their enforcement. 
2 
In 1643 the excise tax was created, granting officials 
the authority to search private homes. Having previously 
been an issue that concerned only members of the press, 
adoption of the excise tax brought the controversy 
surrounding general searches to every home in England. That 
initiated a period of increasing awareness of the concept of 
individual rights, and general searches came to be widely 
regarded as arbitrary and violative of those rights. 
However, in the midst of this growing public sentiment, 
Parliament passed the Licensing Act, the toughest press 
restriction yet, making it illegal to publish anything 
without a license from the king. Although this act expired 
in 1679, many of its provisions had become so ingrained in 
the common law that they continued to be employed long after 
that. It was those provisions that eventually proved 
responsible for popularizing the fight against general 
warrants in England. 1 
Following the adoption of the Licensing Act cases for 
seditious libel became quite common in England, and the 
primary means used to enforce libel laws was the general 
warrant of search and arrest. These warrants, commonly 
issued by the secretary of state, simply stated that a 
violation of law had occurred, or was suspected to have 
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occurred, and authoriz~d officials to conduct a search for 
offenders or evidence. Places to be searched were not 
specified in the warrant, nor was there any designation of 
who should be arrested or what things should be seized. 
These issues were left entirely to the discretion of the 
officers charged with executing the writ. 2 
The first famous case disputing the use of a general 
warrant in England arose in 1762. John Wilkes, a member of 
Parliament at the time, had been anonymously publishing 9 
collection of tracts entitled the "North Briton" that were 
critical of various government actions. The release of the 
forty-fifth edition, however, so enraged officials that Lord 
Halifax, secretary of state, issued a general warrant 
directing the messengers: 
to make strict and diligent search for the 
authors, printers, and publishers of a seditious 
and treasonable paper, entitled, The North Briton, 
No. 45, ... and them, or any of them, having 
found, to apprehend and seize, together with their 
papers. 3 
Based on that authority forty-nine arrests were made in 
three days. When the messengers arrived at Wilkes's door, 
however, he defied their authority and refused to obey the 
warrant. He was then imprisoned, his home was ransacked 
anyway, and his belongings were taken for use as evidence.' 
Wilkes immediately filed suits for trespass against 
everyone connected with the warrant, 5 all the way up to 
Lord Halifax himself. The printers who had been subjected 
to similar searches also filed suit for false imprisonment. 
4 
The warrant was held illegal by Chief Justice Pratt who 
stated, "To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless 
warrant in order to procure evidence, is worse than the 
Spanish Inquisition; a law under which no Englishman would 
wish to live an hour. 116 In one of the later cases 
contesting this warrant Pratt went on to argue that if 
secretaries of state possessed the authority to issue 
general warrants, "it certainly may affect the person and 
property of every man in this kingdom, and is totally 
subversive of the liberty of the subject. '17 
The government appealed the decisions, but when of they 
reached the Court of the King's Bench, the lower court's 
decisions were upheld. In one of the ap~eals the judges of 
the Court of the King's Bench dismissed the histbry of 
executive discretion in issuing and executing warrants, 
stating that no amount of time could legitimize such 
practices. Chief Justice Mansfield summarized the feelings 
of the court by stating, "It is not fit that the judging of 
the information should be left to the officer. The 
magistrate should judge, and give certain directions to the 
officer. 118 So important was that principle to the court 
that when all was said and done, they had ordered the 
British government to pay the extraordinary sum of 100,000 
pounds cumulatively in costs and judgements as a result of 
the Wilkes cases. The decisions met with widespread 
approval in England and the American colonies where "Wilkes 
, 
and Liberty" became a widely used slogan in support of 
American causes. 9 
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That was not the end of the matter, however; the 
victories of the Wilkesites were to have more serious and 
far reaching repercussions. Other victims of similar 
warrants were inspired by the success of the Wilkes cases 
and filed suits of their own. It was in the resulting flood 
of litigation Entick v. Carrington (1765), widely acclaimed 
as a hallmark of English liberty, came to trial. 10 John 
Entick was the author of another allegedly subversive 
publication entitled "Monitor" or "British Freeholder." A 
warrant was issued for his arrest which, unlike the warrant 
in the Wilkes cases, named him specifically as the suspect 
to be arrested. However, the seizure of papers and other 
evidence was still left to the discretion of the messengers 
who served the warrant. Entick therefore sued for trespass 
regarding the seizure of his papers based on the open 
warrant.u 
Pratt, at this time Lord Camden, heard this case and 
issued its now famous decision. Camden wrote that a 
decision in favor of the government would force open even 
the peoples' most secret cabinets to government inspection 
on mere suspicion that a person is involved in the 
publication or dissemination of seditious libel. He 
therefore asserted that general warrants for search or 
arrest could no longe+ be issued by the executive branch, 
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and that evidence seized in the execution of such a warrant 
could not be used in coutt because that would amount to self 
incrimination, which he argued, "would be 'cruel and unjust' 
to the innocent and guilty alike. 1112 
At the same time as all of that upheaval in England, 
the debate over the validity of general searches was also 
raging in the colonies. In 1696 Parliament had authorized 
the use of writs of assistance by customs officials to aid 
the enforcement of strict British tax and trade regulations 
in the colonies. So named because they authorized officials 
to command all officials and subjects of the crown to aid in 
their execution, 13 writs of assistance became the focus of 
the controversy surrounding the use of general warrants in 
America because of the unbridled discretionary power they 
granted to the officers. Although the general warrants 
commonly used in England left it to the officers' discretion 
who to arrest and what papers to seize, their application 
was at least somewhat limited in the sense that they were 
confined to one particular case. Writs of assistance not 
only left those issues open, but had the additional malady 
of permanence because they did not expire after execution 
and were not limited to one particular case. Once granted, 
the writ remained valid for the lifetime of the reigning 
sovereign. Moreover, the writs also authorized officers to 
knock down doors and break open trunks if necessary to 
overcome resistance, giving officials unfettered discretion 
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to search anything they wished whenever they suspected a 
customs violation. 14 
By the 1750s, however, many colonists were growing 
sensitive to the dangers of relying on the use of those 
general warrants for law enforcement. Massive opposition 
arose in 1754 with the passage of that year's excise act 
which granted tax collectors the authority to interrogate 
anyone they wished regarding the amount of liquor they had 
consumed in the past year and tax it by the gallon. As a 
result of this uproar, in 1756 Massachusetts became the 
first province to enact legislation requiring some elements 
of particularity before a warrant could be granted. The new 
law required a sworn oath by the informant that they knew an 
infraction of law occurred in a specified place. Even so, 
judges were not allowed to make any inquiry or determination 
of their own as to the reliability of the information given, 
but were required to supply the warrant once that provision 
was met. 15 
During the 1760s the controversy over the legality of 
writs of assistance in the American colonies reached its 
culmination. On October 25, 1760, George II died and, 
according to the law, all writs of assistance expired within 
six months of his death. In February of 1761 sixty-three 
Boston merchants petitioned for a hearing on the issue of 
granting new writs. James Otis, Jr. resigned his position 
as advocate general in order to avoid defending the writs 
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and represented the merchants who opposed them. 16 Otis 
presented evidence drawn from every possible source, from 
the rhetorical ideal of a man's home as his castle up to 
provisions of the British constitution itself, to show that 
any warrant that was not specific could not be granted. He 
denounced writs of assistance as villainous instruments of 
arbitrary power because of their perpetual and universal 
nature which allowed officials to conduct searches in 
violation of fundamental principles of English liberty and 
the Magna Carta. He concluded that the act of Parliament 
creating writs of assistance was void because it violated 
the British constitution, and therefore courts could not 
issue them. 17 Despite his efforts, Otis lost the case and 
in December of 1761 the first new writ was issued to Charles 
Paxton, surveyor of the Port of Boston. 18 
However, it was not the actual ruling that was the 
important thing about Paxton's case, but the impact that 
James Otis's arguments were to have in the future. John 
Adams, in his mid-twenties at the time, was present in the 
g~llery, and the influence that Otis's arguments had on him 
was profound. "Mr. Otis's oration against the Writs of 
Assistance," Adams would say many years later, "breathed 
into this nation the breath of life. . Then and there 
was the first scene of opposition to the arbitrary claims of 
Great Britain. Then and there the child of Independence was 
born. 1119 The inspirational affect that Otis had upon Adams 
9 
is of great consequence because of the direct progression 
that can be seen from Otis's argument in 1761 to Article XIV 
of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights framed by Adams 
in 1780 to the Fourth Amendment as it appears today. 20 
The decision in Paxton's case was not very popular, and 
the ability of officials to secure new writs of assistance 
did little in the way of controlling the smuggling that the 
writs were created to remedy. For many years bribery of 
customs officials was a commonly used method of evading 
tariffs, but an order from England for tougher enforcement 
of those laws and the passage of the Stamp Act became more 
than the colonists would bare. Riots broke out in 1765, and 
when property was seized for customs violations it was often 
liberated by merchants and others who opposed writs of 
assistance.n 
Due to concerns about their legality, many colonial 
courts refused to even grant these controversial writs. 
Under the laws at that time the only court vested with the 
authority to issue writs of assistance was the Court of 
Exchequer. It was therefore argued that since Massachusetts 
was the only province that had expanded the jurisdiction of 
its high court to include the jurisdiction of the Court of 
Exchequer, that was the only place that could issue the 
writ. In order to remedy that legal technicality, in March 
of 1767, Charles Townshend, Chancellor of the Court of 
Exchequer, reported a bill to the House of Commons that 
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became the Townshend Act, which granted the supreme court in 
each province the power to issue the writ. By this time, 
however, the idea of "constitutionality" was gaining 
popularity in American legal thought, and even the Townshend 
Act did not solve the problem. Courts still refused to 
grant the writs, arguing that they violated Magna Carta 
because of the discretion they left to the officers charged 
with their enforcement. 22 
CONSTITUTIONAL MILESTONES 
By 1776 American resolve for independence was fixed. 
In that year the Declaration of Independence was written, 
codifying American ideals of limited government and 
underscoring the importance with which they regarded 
personal liberties. That same year also saw the emergence 
of the first state constitutions. The various search and 
seizure provisions contained in those documents were the 
first to elevate the concept of reasonable search and 
seizure to a constitutional plane. Through them those 
concepts were molded and refined into the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. 
The first state to draft a constitutional search and 
seizure provision was Virginia. Article 10 of its 
Declaration of Rights stated: 
That general warrants, whereby any officer or 
messenger may be commanded to search suspected 
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places without evidence of a fact committed, or to 
seize any person or persons not named, or whose 
offence is not particularly described and 
supported by evidence, are grievous and 
oppressive, and ought not to be granted. 23 
Although George Mason was the author of most of Virginia's 
Declaration of Rights, he did not write Article 10. That 
provision was added by the convention that adopted 
Virginia's Declaration of Rights. However, the fact that 
the rest of Madison's proposals were adopted with very few 
other changes shows the importance with which the issues 
surrounding search and seizure principles were widely 
held. 24 Although Virginia's was a somewhat weak provision, 
because it was only directed against general warrants and 
merely said that they "ought" not be granted without 
specifically prohibiting them, it did provide a foundation 
for later state constitutions to build upon. 
Pennsylvania adopted its constitution only a few months 
later and made some important advances in its search and 
seizure provision. The form of Section 10 of Pennsylvania's 
Declaration of Rights bares a strong resemblance to the 
forthcoming Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution in 
many respects. First of all, instead of merely focusing on 
protection from general warrants, the Pennsylvania provision 
recognized the right to be free from unreasonable search and 
seizure in the more broad sense. Its guidelines requiring 
specificication of things to be seized, and affirmations of 
actual knowledge of criminal conduct were also novel 
J 
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advancements that were to become significant aspects of the 
Fourth Amendment. Delaware ~icked up on the idea of 
specificity, and its Declaration of Rights became the first 
to clearly state that warrants that were not specific were 
illegal.~ 
The relatively belated adoption of the search and 
seizure provision in the Massachusetts constitution of 1780, 
also had a major impact on the Fourth Amendment. Written by 
John Adams, who had been so impressed with James Otis's 
speech denouncing general warrants in Paxton's Case some 
twenty years earlier, the language of Article 14 was 
remarkably detailed. It is in that article that we see the 
first use of the actual phrase "unreasonable search, and 
seizure" that would later appear in the Fourth Amendment. 
Having recognized the right of the individual to be secure 
from such searches, it went on to describe the restrictions 
on them with a degree of particularity that was not given to 
any other provision in that constitution. 26 
In the spring of 1787 the Constitutional Convention 
convened in Philadelphia. Although their original purpose 
was to repair the failing Articles of Confederation, they 
ended up scrapping the articles altogether, and writing a 
new Constitution that created a supreme federal government 
with enormous powers. 27 When the delegates had completed 
their work and prepared to submit the new constitution to 
the states for ratification, a great clamor arose calling 
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for the addition of a Bill of Rights to protect the peoples' 
civil liberties from encroachment by this new and powerful 
government. Having fueled the drive for independence, the 
issues of search·and seizure were especially important to 
the framers' generation, and they figured prominently 
throughout the debates surrounding the inclusion and 
creation of a Bill of Rights in the coming years. 
The Constitution's initial lack of a Bill of Rights was 
a conscious and deliberate act by the framers. Having 
completed the writing of the Constitution, it was sent to 
the Committee of Style in order to have copies made for its 
introduction to the Congress. It was then that George 
Mason, the Virginia delegate, commented that he thought it 
ought to have a Bill of Rights in order to assure the people 
that the awesome powers of the new government would not be 
used in violation of individual rights. When a formal 
motion was made to include a Bill of Rights, however, it was 
unanimously defeated. Refusing to leave things at that, 
Mason used the back of a final copy of the Constitution to 
list his "Objections to this Constitution of Government," 
with the absence of a Bill of Rights appearing at the head 
of the list. When Mason's objections found their way to a 
printer's office the battle lines were drawn and the debate 
over the ratification of the Constitution became centered on 
this issue. 28 
The Anti-Federalists opposed ratification because they 
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feared the awesome powers that the newly written 
Constitution granted to the federal government and wanted a 
Bill of Rights added to guarantee the protection of 
individual liberties. 29 They particularly feared the list 
of Congressional powers which, in addition to the powers of 
taxation and regulation of trade, included the power "to 
make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into execution the foregoing powers. 11= Since the 
new constitution would become the supreme law of the land 
once ratified, the necessary and proper clause seemed 
particularly foreboding to Anti-Federalists who viewed it as 
an unrestrained grant of power that would authorize laws 
that would be damaging to state interests and personal 
rights.n 
The Federalists, on the other hand, supported the 
Constitution as it was written and argued that it would not 
be necessary to include a Bill of Rights for two primary 
reasons. First of all, the rights of the people were 
protected by the various state bills of rights that already 
existed, and the new constitution would not alter those. 32 
Secondly, American political thinking was based largely on 
the social compact theory which, roughly stated, holds that 
government exists only by the consent of the people, and is 
created by a written compact that is superior to it and 
limits it. The Federalists therefore argued that since the 
new national government could only exercise the powers that 
15 
the Constitution expressly granted it, the government could 
not abridge the peoples' civil rights because the 
Constitution did not grant such a power. 33 
As the Constitution made its way to the various state 
ratifying conventions, the debate over the inclusion of a 
bill of rights went with it. The position of the Anti-
Federalists was gaining support and ratification did not 
seem likely. Numerous recommendations for amendments were 
offered by many states, and four states even requested a 
second Congressional Convention to address some of the 
Constitution's shortcomings. The possibility of a second 
convention scarred many Federalists who thought that it 
would destroy many of the provisions that were necessary for 
the new government to succeed. 34 
Although Thomas Jefferson was in Paris at this time, he 
deserves much of the credit for the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights. Upon occasion to read the Constitution, Jefferson 
wrote his friend James Madison, a leading Federalist, that 
although he general approved of it, he opposed the exclusion 
of a bill of rights securing the personal liberties that 
were so important to Americans. 35 The power that a bill of 
rights would give to the independent judicial branch in the 
protection of personal liberties against possible majority 
oppression was of special importance to Jefferson. 36 
Madison, eager to avoid the dangers of a second 
convention, was finally convinced. He appealed to the 
16 
states to ratify the Constitution as it stood and promised 
to make the consideration of civil liberties protections the 
first order of business for the First Congress. 37 In the 
end Madison and the Federalists won, and the Constitution 
received the necessary votes for ratification. 38 The 
Virginia convention was the first to ratify with 
recommendations for amendments, including a search and 
seizure provision. Later states copied that practice, many 
even including their own search and seizure 
recommendations. 39 
During the spring of 1789, Madison went to work on 
keeping his promise. In the course of a few short weeks he 
drew together the state ratifying conventions' suggestions 
and compiled a list of proposed amendments to protect the 
civil liberties of the colonists. 40 Madison made some very 
significant advancements in his work on the issues of search 
and seizure. The initial draft of his sixth Article was the 
strongest search and seizure provision yet, and appeared 
nearly the same as the Fourth Amendment does today. In 
addition to its affirmative recognition of the right of 
citizens to be free from "unreasonable searches and 
seizures," a direct copy of the language from Adams's 
provision in the Massachusetts constitution, Article Six 
required probable cause, not merely suspicion, before a 
warrant could be issued. Article Six was also the first to 
use the stronger words "shall not be violated" instead of 
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the weaker "ought not" that plagued earlier provisions. 41 
On June 8, 1789, Madison read his proposals in the 
House of Representatives. 42 No longer concerned with 
amending the Constitution, the representatives had turned 
their attention to more immediate issues, such as raising 
money to run the new government, and Madison's proposals 
were not discussed. After six weeks passed Madison 
requested that his amendments be taken under consideration 
again. Many of the representatives complained that 
Madison's proposals would be a waste of their time, 
sidetracking them from more important issues, and the 
amendments were assigned to a special committee instructed 
to pick out the best proposals for consideration by the rest 
of the House. 43 When the committee reported back one week 
later its report was tabled and the House did not actually 
begin debating the amendments until August 13." 
Having once led the forces of opposition to the 
amendments, Madison became their sponsor and had to defend 
them against some of the very arguments he himself had 
raised. In response to the argument that a bill of rights 
was not necessary because state constitutions already 
provided for the protection of personal liberties Madison 
replied that some states did not have a bill of rights, and 
others were very weak and often violated by state 
governments.' 5 Responding to the core Federalist 
contention that the Bill of Rights was unnecessary because 
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of the social compact theory of limited powers, Madison said 
that although the new government's powers were indeed 
limited, they still allowed for a degree of discretion in 
their execution that could be abused. In one debate on the 
subject Madison said: 
I will state an instance, which I think in point, 
and proves that this might be the case. The 
General Government has a right to pass all laws 
which shall be necessary to collect its revenue; 
the means for enforcing the collection are within 
the discretion of the Legislature; may not general 
warrants be considered necessary for this purpose 
• • • ?46 
Protection from the evils of general warrants was 
particularly important to Madison. That issue was partly 
responsible for his coming to regard a Bill of Rights as 
necessary, and was something he made repeated reference to 
as an illustration of its necessity in his speeches 
promoting the Bill of Rights. 47 
While in the special committee, the search and seizure 
provision proposed by Madison had been altered so that in 
their report it read: 
The right of the people to be secured in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall not be 
violated, by warrants issuing without probable 
cause, supported by oath of affirmation, and not 
particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized. 48 
In the debates in the House, however, Representative 
Eldbridge Gerry assumed that the "unreasonable searches and 
seizures" phrase had been omitted by mistake and moved that 
it be returned. Representative Benson then had the words 
19 
"by warrants issuing" replaced with "and no warrant shall 
issue. 1149 Finally a semi-colon was inserted in the middle 
of the provision, dividing it into two parts; the first half 
established the right of the people and prohibited 
unreasonable searches and seizures, the second half laid 
down the requirements necessary to secure specific 
warrants. 50 No further changes were made in this provision 
except its number before it was sent with the other 17 
amendments for approval by the Senate. 
In the Senate debates, which were kept secret, those 
proposals were altered, combined, and cut down to 12. The 
House refused to accept the Senate's revised list, and a 
conference committee comprised of members of both the House 
and Senate was created to reach a compromise. On September 
24, 1789, the committee's report was approved by both 
houses, and the final 12 amendments were ready to be sent 
for state ratification. 51 Records of the activities at the 
state ratifying conventions are scant, and therefore little 
is known about them beyond the count of votes. We do know, 
however, that the first two amendments (addressing 
representation in Congress and congressional salaries) 
failed to receive the necessary votes. 
On December 15, 1791, the surviving 10 amendments 
completed the ratification process, altering the United 
States Constitution for the first time. 52 Labelled as the 
Fourth Amendment, the search and seizure provisions 
20 
contained in the Bill of Rights comprised the broadest and 
most liberal restrictions yet known. It was then up to the 
courts to give substance to the language of that amendment 
and perform the function that Jefferson and Madison had 
advocated as the protector of the peoples' rights. 
SEARCH ARD SEIZURE IN THE SUPREME COURT 
Interpretation of the Fourth Amendment by the United 
States Supreme Court has recognized that its protection of 
citizens is in the three primary requirements that the 
warrant clause places on constitutional searches. 53 First, 
warrants must issue from "neutral and detached" magistrates, 
not police officers or other government agents. 54 Second 
warrants can only issue upon a showing of probabl 'e cause so 
that only searches with merit will proceed. 55 Lastly, that 
the warrant specifically describe the place and object of 
the search so the searcher will not exceed the limit of 
their authority. 56 
However, the language and structure of the amendment 
suggest that not all searches need to be supported by a 
warrant to be constitutional, they need only be reasonable. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has recognized various 
situations in which it is permissible for officials to 
conduct searches without first obtaining a warrant, but has 
held that such searches are subject to post hoc judicial 
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review where their reasonableness is to be measured against 
the dictates of the warrant clause. During the past two 
decades, however, Supreme Court decisions dealing with the 
reasonableness of warrantless searches have been over-
permissive. The number of cases where the Court is willing 
to waive the warrant requirement has grown, probable cause 
standards for warrantless searches have been eased, and 
their permissible scope greatly expanded, resulting in the 
general destruction of the liberty protection that the 
Fourth Amendment was created to provide. 
When considering whether it is reasonable to forego the 
Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement the Supreme Court 
must weigh the interests at stake against each other. It is 
a long established and deeply ingrained cannon of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence that the interest of the citizen is 
that of privacy. In recognition of that principle in 1886, 
writing for the majority in Boyd v. United States, Justice 
Bradley noted that the experience of the framers suggested 
that the Fourth Amendment was meant to: 
apply to all invasions on the part of the 
government and its employees of the sanctity of a 
man's home and the privacies of life. It is not 
the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of 
his drawers, that constitutes the essence of the 
offence; but it is the invasion of his 
indefeasible right of personal security, personal 
liberty and private property • . . . 57 
The government interest, it shall be shown, fluctuates 
somewhat according to the circumstances presented in each 
given case. Placing the respective interests at opposite 
22 
ends of the scale, the reasonableness of a warrantless 
search is then determined by "balancing its intrusion on the 
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 11= 
In the past, recognition of the importance of Fourth 
Amendment liberties typically weighed the scale in favor of 
the individual, and the prior judicial authorization of a 
search warrant was nearly always required. In 1972, for 
example, the Supreme Court decided a case where without the 
support of a warrant the United States Attorney General had 
ordered the use of a wiretap to gain information on three 
defendants accused of conspiracy to destroy government 
property. When the issue reached the Supreme Court, the 
Attorney General argued that the wiretap was defensible 
because it was necessary to protect domestic security, but 
the Court held that even the government's concededly 
significant interest in domestic security was not enough to 
justify the warrantless invasion of Fourth Amendment 
freedoms that the wiretap entailed. 59 
More recently, however, the Court has been increasing 
the weight allotted to government interests. At first the 
change was relatively small, but it steadily grew. In Terry 
v. Ohio, for example, recognizing that police officers often 
find themselves in dangerous situations when investigating 
crime, the Court said that in the interest of self 
protection an officer may conduct a cursory "frisk" of a 
23 
suspect's outer clothing for weapons without having to first 
obtain a warrant. 60 But within four years of the Terry 
decision efficient law enforcement was said to be a weighty 
enough interest to justify a warrantless search. Upholding 
the power of a Federal Treasury agent to conduct a 
warrantless search of the storeroom of a pawn shop for 
weapons violations, the Court stated that, "if the law is to 
be properly enforced an inspection made effective, 
inspections without warrant must be deemed reasonable 
official conduct under the Fourth Amendment. 1161 
Furthermore, the increased weight given to the 
interests of government seems to have come directly away 
from that of the Fourth Amendment interests of citizens. 
Searches conducted by administrative agencies to enforce 
civil codes are particularly illustrative of that principle. 
In 1967 the Court required inspectors to secure a warrant 
before conducting fire and health code inspections despite 
their acknowledgement those searches were minimally 
intrusive of individuals' privacy interests. 62 Five years 
later, however, the Court upheld the power of Federal 
Treasury agents to conduct warrantless searches of 
businesses. 63 Then in 1981 the government's interest in 
health and safety issues was claimed to uphold warrantless 
mine inspections because the privacy interest that owners 
have in commercial property was said to be less than that of 
a private residence. 64 
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Automobile searches are another telling example of the 
slippage in this area. The Supreme Court has stated that 
for Fourth Amendment purposes there is a difference between 
one's car and one's home, ascribing a lesser privacy 
interest to the former. The justifications offered for that 
determination have included: the inherent mobility of 
automobiles makes them easy to move before a warrant can be 
obtained;= automobile use is highly regulated;~ cars are 
used for transportation on public streets where they are 
readily visible. 67 As the perceived weight of individ~als' 
privacy expectation in automobiles has dropped, the 
government has been given greater latitude to conduct 
warrantless searches of vehicles. Safety of officers in the 
streets was once deemed a significant enough interest to 
uphold such a search when an officer believed themselves to 
be in danger. 68 In view of the diminished privacy rights 
in automobiles, however, officers have been able to defend a 
warrantless vehicle search even after the suspect ha~ been 
taken into police custody. 69 
In accordance with their recognition that the 
reasonableness of a search is derived from its adherence to 
the guidelines of the warrant requirement, 70 the Supreme 
Court has held that even with the most serious of government 
interests at stake a warrantless search will be considered 
unconstitutional absent a showing of probable cause. In 
Berger v. New York the Court defined probable cause and 
stated the purpose b~hind its requirement: 
Probable cause under the Fourth Amendment exists 
where the facts and circumstances within the 
affiant's knowledge, and of which he has 
reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient 
unto themselves to warrant a man of reasonable 
caution to believe that an offense has been or is 
being committed .•.• The purpose of the 
probable-cause requirement of the Fourth 
Amendment, to keep the state out of 
constitutionally protected areas until it has 
reason to believe that a specific crime has been 
or is being committed . . . . n 
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However, along with the Court's approval of warrantless 
searches in a growing number of cases came a shift in the 
definition of the probable cause standard needed to justify 
them. Recall the case of Terry v. Ohio, mentioned above. 
In that case a police officer had observed behavior of three 
individuals that seemed suspicious, so he decided to 
investigate. Upon approaching the suspects, the officer 
patted down the outer clothing of one of them and found a 
gun. Although the Court recognized that the officer did not 
have actual knowledge of any facts that would indicate that 
the suspects had committed or were committing a crime, it 
held that given the possibility of harm to himself or 
others, the officer merely needed to "be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant 
that intrusion. 1172 Terry's articulable suspicion standard, 
also known as the reasonable suspicion test, is still used 
by the Court today when judging probable cause for 
investigative stops, even after having stated: 
---------- --~ -- - -
Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard 
than probable cause not only in the sense that 
reasonable suspicion can be established with 
information that is different in quantity or 
content than that required to establish probable 
cause, but also in the sense that reasonable 
suspicion can arise from information that is less 
reliable than that required to show probable 
cause. 73 
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Perhaps, given the exigencies confronting officers when 
investigating suspicious and possibly dangerous incidents, 
the reasonable suspicion standard can be justified. As time 
progressed, however, the Court even did away with that in 
arrest situations. In 1973 the Court held that when an 
officer makes a lawful arrest, no additional justification 
need be offered to conduct a full search of the arrestee. 74 
Adding to that rule in New York v. Belton the Court stated 
that an officer need not make any special showing of 
probable cause, or even reasonable suspicion, in order to 
search someone they have arrested because "the lawful 
custodial arrest justifies the infringement of any privacy 
interest the arrestee may have. 1175 In 1989 that principle 
was taken to the extreme when a federal employees' union 
challenged the constitutionality of a United States Customs 
Service program requiring employees desiring promotion to 
submit to a drug test. Rejecting the employees' claim that 
the tests failed the Fourth Amendment's probable cause 
requirement because they were not based on any suspected 
drug use within the Customs Service, the Court ruled that 
"neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any 
measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable 
component of reasonableness in every circumstance. 1176 
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One of the most suspect developments in the Court's 
treatment of probable cause during recent years is their 
abdication of responsibility for the matter. The Court has 
simply left probable cause determinations to other branches 
of government and deferred to their judgement, thereby 
effectively eliminating the security of even post search 
judicial review of reasonableness. In the case of 
administrative searches, for example, the Court recognized 
that even searches conducted to enforce civil codes 
implicate the privacy protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
However, the Court has distinguished between the probable 
cause necessary to justify criminal and civil 
investigations, holding that where the purpose of the search 
is not to uncover evidence of criminal wrong doing, 
legislative or administrative standards satisfy the probable 
cause requirement. 77 That general principle of deferring 
to legislative judgement in this area was re-emphasized in 
1981 when the Court stated that the warrants may be bypassed 
when "Congress has reasonably determined that warrantless 
searches are necessary to further a regulatory scheme ... 
1178 
Police agencies have also been given the discretion to 
create their own standards of probable cause in some cases. 
In 1976, for example, the Supreme Court upheld a conviction 
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based on evidence seized during a warrantless inventory 
search of a car that had been impounded for numerous parking 
violations. Defining them as "routine practice" and noting 
that their primary objective is to protect police from 
claims of theft, the Court held that inventory searches were 
constitutionally valid. The Court has further stated that 
probable cause is only necessary in criminal investigations 
and therefore there need be no showing of it for searches 
that are not aimed at discovering evidence for criminal 
prosection. 79 Hence we read in a 1987 decision that: 
reasonable police regulations relating to 
inventory procedures administered in good faith 
satisfy the Fourth Amendment, even though courts 
might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise 
equally reasonable rules requiring a different 
procedure. so 
By requiring that warrant requests include information 
"particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized" the Fourth Amendment 
requires judges to limit the search to its proper scope. 
Regrettably, the constitutionally permissible scope of a 
search is defined by the interests and probable cause 
justifying its initiation, and the Court's expansive reading 
of those issues has led to an expansion in the scope that a 
warrantless search is allowed. Drawing from the lessons of 
past cases, in Terry v. Ohio the Court established that when 
considering the legitimate scope of a warrantless search, 
courts should examine "whether it was reasonably related in 
scope to the circumstances which justified the interference 
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in the first place."M Application of the test created in 
that case led the Terry Court to the conclusion that, the 
only justification for initiating the search at issue there 
being to obviate the possibility of harm to the officer or 
others nearby, the permissible scope of that search had to 
be limited to only those actions necessary to detect 
weapons. Accordingly, the officer's cursory "frisk" of the 
suspect's outer clothing was upheld because it was no more 
intrusive than necessary. 82 
Although Terry dealt specifically with an investigatory 
stop where the threat of danger to the officer was yet 
unknown, Chimel v. California used the scope limitation 
principle that Terry established as a touchstone in its 
limitation of the proper scope of searches conducted in 
conjunction with a lawful arrest. Prior to Chimel when a 
person was arrested virtually all of their possessions could 
be searched in order to procure evidence of the crime. 83 
In Chimel, however, using the need to protect officers' 
safety as the foundation of its decision, the Court held 
that the scope of such searches must be limited to the 
arrestee's person and the area within their immediate reach 
or control, from which they could grab a weapon. Although 
Chimel did restrict the physical area that could legally be 
searched, its shortcoming was in still allowing general 
searches for unspecified evidentiary items within that area 
that previous cases in that genre allowed. 84 
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Subsequent decisions would also leave the possibility 
of evidentiary search open and distort even the physical 
limitation created in Chimel with expansive readings of what 
constituted "the area within the arrestee's control." In 
1981, for example, a case came before the Court where, after 
smelling and seeing what he believed to be marijuana in a 
car he had pulled over for speeding, a New York State 
policeman arrested the occupants of the vehicle for 
possession of marijuana. While stating to apply the Terry 
and Chimel guidelines, the Court upheld the officer's 
subsequent search of a zipped jacket pocket in the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle that led to one of the suspect's 
conviction for possession of cocaine, as being a search of 
the area within the arrestee's immediate control. 85 
The very next year the Court was confronted with a case 
where police officers arrested a suspect and searched his 
vehicle pursuant to an anonymous tip that stated he was 
involved in drug trafficking. Having found the suspect and 
vehicle described by the anonymous caller, off~cers took nim 
into custody and then entered the trunk of his car. After 
finding a bag in the trunk that contained what appeared to 
be narcotics, the car was taken to the police station where 
it was searched again and a large amount of cash was found. 
When the case reached the Supreme Court it was determined 
that the anonymous tip supplied the necessary degree of 
probable cause to initiate the search and defined its proper 
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scope. Moreover, the Court stated that given probable 
cause, the power of officers to search without a warrant is 
as broad as a warrant could authorize. Once the search has 
begun, wrote the Court: 
nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and 
containers, in the case of a home, or between 
glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and 
wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must 
give way to the interest in the prompt and 
efficient completion of the task at hand. 86 
That principle was echoed in Colorado v. Bertine where the 
Court upheld an inventory search of an automobile pursuant 
to an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol in 
which the officer opened a closed backpack and found drugs 
and cash that were used to convict the owner on drug 
charges.n 
These current trends in the Court's treatment of 
warrantless searches are in direct conflict with the spirit 
and purpose of the Fourth Amendment directives. Admittedly, 
the language of the Fourth Amendment conceives of 
warrantless searches, but given the history of the amendment 
it is obvious that the framers meant to seriously 
circumscribe them. The injustices of general searches 
conducted under the authority of writs of assistance were 
largely responsible for the move towards independence, and 
were uppermost in the minds of the men who drafted the 
restrictions on the powers of search and seizure the Fourth 
Amendment contains. Just more than two centuries after the 
adoption of those protections, however, the Supreme Court 
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has re-exposed citizens to many of the evils that the 
framers intended to eradicate. 
The Court's weakening of Fourth Amendment liberties can 
be seen at all of the previously discussed levels of 
analysis. In the weight allotted to the various interests 
at stake when conducting their balancing test, the breakdown 
is apparent at two points. First, allowing law enforcement 
efficiency to be used as a calculable interest, as was done 
in United States v. Biswell for example, is clearly a 
retreat from the amendment's history. This becomes obvious 
recalling that the Fourth Amendment was created to eliminate 
the use of writs of assistance which were obviously very 
efficient law enforcement tools. Secondly, the Court's 
reading down of the importance of individuals' Fourth 
Amendment interests in different settings also belies the 
intent of the amendment. In the case of administrative 
searches, for example, the opinion of the court has been 
that warrantless inspections are okay because of the 
perceived decreased privacy interest owners have in 
commercial property. History shows, however, that it was 
merchants who were most troubled by writs of assistance in 
the colonies. Their having led the first major battle 
against them in Paxton's case, provides a compelling 
indication that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect 
businesses. Furthermore, the Court's holdings that 
individuals enjoy a lesser privacy expectation in 
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automobiles fails to properly account for their 
pervasiveness in today's society. With as much time as 
Americans spend with their cars and the degree to which 
society depends on automotive transportation that is a 
difficult premise to accept. 
The probable cause standard has also been the subject 
of the Court's abuse. In order to secure themselves from 
arbitrary government intrusions, the framers required that 
the government have actual knowledge indicating that a 
specified crime had been or would be committed before 
conducting a search. Here again the colonists' experience 
with writs of assistance was proof enough of the need to 
require that searches be based on knowledge of criminal 
activity, not just suspicion. However, through a series of 
decisions leading to the statement in Treasury Employees v. 
Von Raab that even individualized suspicion is not always 
necessary, the Supreme Court has all but removed the 
probable cause requirement from warrantless searches. Where 
the requirement has been left it has been the Court's policy 
to defer to the judgements of other government branches as 
to the proper standard to enforce. This has included 
letting police agencies define probable cause for routine 
matters, a practice dangerously reminiscent of the executive 
discretion in writs of assistance. 
The framers sought to further insulate themselves from 
arbitrary exercises of government power by requiring those 
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who wished to search to specify the area and object of the 
search and confine its scope to those things indicated. 
Colonists had endured broad and extensive general searches, 
and meant to end that practice with the provisions of the 
Fourth Amendment. Unfortunately, application of those 
principles by the Supreme Court has nearly read those 
provisions out of existence. Although Chimel v. California 
limited searches conducted incident to arrests to the area 
within which a suspect could grab a weapon, that is a 
somewhat empty protection of liberty. Presumably such a 
search can only be executed after the suspect has already 
been taken into custody, but the Chimel doctrine would still 
allow an officer to search the immediate area of the arrest 
scene even after the suspect is no longer a threat. Chimel 
also allows officers to search for evidence in that general 
area, despite the similarity of such action to the 
evidentiary searches authorized by general warrants, like 
that of the Wilkes case cited above, that the Fourth 
Amendment was created to stop. Furthermore, the Court has 
held that the scope of warrantless searches may extend as 
far as a warrant could authorize, thereby placing more 
discretion in the hands of the searching officer, contrary 
to the framers' demands. 
Taken by themselves each of these variations from 
required Fourth Amendment principles may seem insignificant, 
but on the whole, viewed in light of the history that 
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resulted in the creation of those principles, a general 
pattern of erosion of citizens' protected freedoms emerges 
which is unacceptable. As Justice Bradley wrote in 1886: 
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its 
mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate 
and unconstitutional practices get their first 
footing in that way, namely: by silent approaches 
and slight deviations from legal modes of 
procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering 
to the rule that constitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property should be 
liberally construed •••. It is the duty of 
courts to be watchful for the constitutional 
rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy 
encroachments thereon.~ 
It is true that the Fourth Amendment allows warrantless 
searches in some circumstances, but great care must be 
exercised in defining and limiting those situations in order 
to preserve the protections that the framers valued so 
highly. That standard of care is entirely lacking in the 
current trend of Supreme Court decisions. 
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